Hans Vetter Memorial Lecture: Peter Stutchbury
Monday at 6 p.m.
Carnegie Museum of Art Theater
Peter Stutchbury will present a history of design thinking, influences, and outcomes. Stutchbury is the head of Peter Stutchbury Architecture, an architectural firm based in Sydney, Australia. The firm has won 41 Royal Australian Institute of Architects awards, and its work has been exhibited internationally, including two exhibitions at the Venice Architecture Biennale. Stutchbury and his firm focus on sustainability in their design.
William C. Weldon
Tuesday at 12:30 p.m.
William C. Weldon, the chairman of the board and CEO of Johnson & Johnson, will speak about his experiences in business. He is also a member of the board of directors of JPMorgan Chase & Co. Weldon also serves on the Liberty Science Center Chairman’s Advisory Council, and is a member of the board of trustees for Quinnipiac University.
Umut A. Acar
Wednesday at 1 p.m.
Gates Hillman Complex 6501
Umut A. Acar, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, will deliver a lecture titled “Greedy Sharing: Scheduling on Weakly Consistent Memory.”
Acar will present the recent unpublished results of his and his collaborators’ work on “greedy sharing,” a new algorithm for load balancing on processors with weakly consistent memory.
The algorithm relies on work-sharing, which results in synchronization. Acar will present experiments which show that the algorithm is practical, and discuss future research directions.
Philosophy Colloquium: Branden Fitelson
Thursday at 4:45 p.m.
Baker Hall A53
Branden Fitelson, a professor of philosophy at Rutgers University, will deliver a lecture titled “Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence,” based on his and his collaborator’s work.
Fitelson will briefly discuss the traditionally accepted accuracy, coherence, and evidentiary norms for full belief, as well as the Ramsey-style reasoning that one should be skeptical of analogous norms for partial belief.
He will then describe alternative accuracy and coherency norms for partial belief, and the ways in which analogous norms for full belief lead to a new coherence norm that is weaker than deductive consistency.